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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

*Enemy Supply Losses In Cambodia  
As A Result Of Allied Operations*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
July 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Enemy Supply Losses In Cambodia As A Result  
Of Allied Operations

Introduction

During the period 28 April to 30 June 1970, Allied forces conducted extensive military operations in the VC/NVA base areas along the Cambodia/South Vietnam border. Twelve operations were conducted with the objective of locating and destroying enemy supply installations and disrupting resupply routes and the Communists' command and control apparatus; one was conducted to evacuate Cambodian personnel from northeast Cambodia to South Vietnam. Two of the operations, both conducted by ARVN forces in the Parrot's Beak area, began two days before the official announcement of the incursions on 30 April. This memorandum analyzes the results of Allied operations in Cambodia in terms of the volume and types of supply losses as well as the enemy's reaction to these losses and offers some judgments about the impact of the losses on enemy capabilities.

*Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.*

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Supply Losses

1. During the two months of military operations in Cambodia, Communist supply losses as reported by US and ARVN forces amounted to 9,198 tons of food, weapons and equipment, and ammunition, as shown below\*:

	<u>Short Tons</u>
Food	7,132 <u>a/</u>
Weapons and equipment	301 <u>b/</u>
Ammunition	1,765 <u>c/</u>

a. Including 6,882 tons of rice and 250 tons of salt and miscellaneous foodstuffs.

b. Including 111 tons of weapons and 190 tons of clothing, medical supplies, communications gear, personal equipment, and explosives (other than ammunition). Excluding 19 tons of POL and 431 vehicles.

c. The weight of weapons and ammunition losses reported in this memorandum were calculated on the basis of a revised methodology which utilizes the weight of individual types of weapons and ammunition rather than factors for broad categories of those supplies, as was done in the earlier reports in this series. These more accurate estimates became possible after receipt from the field of more detailed data on the specific types and numbers of captured weapons and ammunition. Appendix B lists by type of weapon, or ammunition, the factors used to derive the tonnage estimates of losses of weapons and ammunition.

The most lucrative caches of all types of supplies were uncovered in the Parrot's Beak (Base Areas 367/706) and Fishhook (Base Areas 352/353) areas and in Base Area 351 [REDACTED] Losses in those areas accounted for 6,984 tons, or

25X1

\* The loss figures reported in this memorandum are those available in Washington as of 20 July. When final reports are received these numbers will undoubtedly change somewhat, but not to a degree significant enough to affect the analysis.

nearly 80% of total supply captures of rice, weapons, and ammunition. Operation Fishhook yielded a total capture of 3,044 tons of supplies. Two operations, including Rock Crusher IV, directed at the Parrot's Beak, yielded a total of 1,534 tons captured, and the Base Area 351 operation yielded 2,406 tons of supplies. These four operations accounted for approximately 78% of rice losses, 87% of ammunition losses, and 63% of weapons losses. In addition, operations into areas flanking the Fishhook (Base Areas 350 and 354) yielded captures of 313 tons of supplies -- mainly rice; and three operations into Base Areas 704 and 709 located west of the Parrot's Beak near the Mekong River yielded 265 tons of supplies, nearly half of which consisted of ammunition.

3. Eight of the 12 operations directed at capturing supplies were conducted by ARVN, two by US troops, and two were joint operations. The two operations in the Parrot's Beak were conducted by ARVN, the Base Area 351 operation by US troops, and the Fishhook operation, which yielded the largest supply caches, jointly by US and ARVN forces. Most operations into the smaller base areas were carried out by ARVN troops, assisted by US advisers. Because of their involvement in the most lucrative areas, however, US forces uncovered more than 60% of the total supply losses.

4. Supply losses were most significant early in the period. Approximately 40% of the total rice captures, 40% of the total weapons losses, and about one-third of the ammunition losses were sustained in the first two weeks of the operations (through 14 May). Food and weapons losses during that period were heaviest in the Fishhook and Parrot's Beak, and ammunition losses were heaviest in the Fishhook and Base Area 351. By 31 May, mid-way through the operation, 79% of the total food, 77% of the weapons, and 70% of the ammunition had been uncovered. Rice made up the largest portion (over 90%) of supplies captured in the northern base areas. More than 1,100 tons of rice were uncovered in the northern Base Areas -- 701, 702, and 740. The small volume of weapons and ammunition losses in these northern base areas suggests that the VC/NVA forces may have had greater success in dispersing stocks held in these base areas than they did in the southern base areas.\*

5. The rate of supply losses followed a downward trend after the initial large caches were uncovered during the first two weeks of operations. During the last six weeks, the daily average of additional captures declined steadily, as shown below:

	<u>Short Tons Per Day</u>			
	<u>30 Apr - 14 May</u>	<u>15-31 May</u>	<u>1-15 June</u>	<u>16-30 June</u>
Food	183	159	68	28
Weapons	3.0	2.4	1.3	0.3
Ammunition	39 <u>a/</u>	37 <u>a/</u>	19	17

*a. Because of major field adjustments in the data, accurate figures are not available for ammunition losses until 22 May; therefore, daily averages are computed for the periods 30 April to 21 May and 22 to 31 May, respectively.*

#### Significance of Losses

##### Total Losses and Stockpiles

6. Communist supply losses in Cambodia have been extensive, but their full impact cannot be measured precisely because of the lack of firm data on the amount of stocks that were there prior to the Allied operations. The Communists are known to have a stockpiling doctrine which calls for supply reserves to exceed anticipated requirements by several fold. On the assumption that this doctrine was adhered to in Cambodia, it is estimated that stockpiles in the Cambodian base areas totaled 15,000 tons, and could have been greater. As an example, the stockpile estimates used in the tabulation below were based on average daily consumption and ground losses during 1969. The most variable of the different classes of supply is ammunition, the expenditure of which is directly influenced by the rate of combat. If the calculations of stockpiles had been based on the higher expenditure rates of 1968, the estimate of ammunition stockpiles would have been 2,700 tons. A comparison of these stockpiles with supply losses is shown in the following tabulation:

<u>Short Tons</u>			
<u>Class of Supply</u>	<u>Estimated Enemy Stockpiles in Cambodia<sup>a</sup>/ Apr 1970</u>	<u>Enemy Losses in Cambodia 30 Apr-30 Jun</u>	<u>Losses as a Percent of Estimated Stocks</u>
Food	10,370	7,132	69
Weapons	460	111	24
Equipment	2,245	190	8
Ammunition	2,255	1,765	78

*a. Using 15-month stock levels as the basis for comparison.*

#### Losses in Perspective

7. The Allied operations against Cambodia captured more than 7,000 tons of foodstuffs, more than 20,000 individual arms, 2,500 crew-served weapons, about 15.7 million rounds of rifle and machinegun ammunition, and 142,000 rounds of rockets, mortars, and recoilless rifle ammunition. The foodstuffs captured would have been enough to feed all of the enemy combat battalions in southern South Vietnam (the area relying on Cambodian base areas for logistic support) for about 10 months. Weapons losses would have been sufficient to equip 53 NVA battalions with individual arms and 38 NVA battalions with crew-served arms. The reported losses of small arms and heavy machinegun ammunition are equivalent, at 1969 force levels and combat rates, to 16 months' requirements, and losses of large rocket, mortar, and recoilless rifle rounds are the equivalent of 9½ months' requirements. The significance of these losses can be put into another perspective by comparing them with losses in South Vietnam during 1969 and the losses the Communists sustained last year in northern Laos, as shown in the following tabulation:

	Short Tons		
	<u>Cambodia</u>	<u>South Vietnam</u>	<u>Northern Laos <sup>a/</sup></u>
Food	7,132	5,883	1,761
Weapons	111	472	240
Ammunition	1,765	1,638	2,563

*a. Including Operation Xieng Khouang and Operation About Face.*

Enemy losses of food and ammunition during the two months of Allied operations in Cambodia exceeded food and ammunition losses sustained in South Vietnam for all of 1969. Food losses in Cambodia were also much higher than those sustained in northern Laos in 1969, although ammunition losses represented only about 70% of the ammunition seized from Communist forces in northern Laos last year.

8. Communist food losses, mainly rice, are the least significant of supply losses because they can be replaced from South Vietnam's harvest or the bumper Cambodian crop harvested in January. Communist weapons losses should not seriously degrade their combat capability. Only 35% of the identified small arms are relatively new models of the type currently used by the Communists (the remainder are older Communist and Free World types). Furthermore, if Hanoi regards these weapons losses as serious, it can be expected that infiltrators will begin carrying their own arms in the future. In 1968 and 1969, most infiltrators did not carry arms during their movement from North Vietnam to South Vietnam but were given weapons after arriving in the base areas along the Cambodia/South Vietnam border. Ammunition losses will be more serious.

The capture of large quantities of ammunition and the forced dispersal of border stocks will compound resupply difficulties, particularly in III and IV Corps.



The Mix of Captured Weapons and Ammunition*Weapons*

9. Field reporting shows that 60% of the weapons seized in Cambodia were of Chinese Communist manufacture, 25% Soviet, 10% East European, and 5% Free World. Analysis of identified enemy individual weapons lost by type shows that 22% were AK-47 rifles, 13% SKS rifles, 36% K-44, and the remaining 29% a mixture of older Communist and Free World arms. The K-44 rifle is an older rifle which was phased out of Communist Main Force units by mid-1969.

10. The ratio of small arms to crew-served weapons captured in Cambodia is 7.9:1, a ratio comparable to weapons losses in South Vietnam in 1969, 7.2:1, and in northern Laos last year, 7.3:1 -- indicating that the Communists maintained balanced stocks of crew-served and individual arms in the Cambodian sanctuaries.

*Ammunition*

11. Preliminary data show that 80% of the ammunition captured in Cambodia is of Chinese Communist origin, 5% Soviet, 10% French and US, and 5% from other Communist countries. Thus some 85% of identified ammunition captured in Cambodia is of Soviet/Chinese manufacture and is compatible with newer weapons currently used by VC/NVA forces. More detailed comparisons of ammunition recovered in Cambodia, South Vietnam, and northern Laos are made in the following tabulation.

Type	Rounds		
	Cambodia 1970	South Vietnam 1969	Northern Laos <sup>a/</sup> 1969
Small arms ammunition	11,447,000	12,403,000	1,847,000
50 caliber or larger	4,249,000		220,200
Grenades	61,400	149,000	14,000
Antiaircraft artillery	199,550	26,800	86,000
Mortar rounds	68,750	190,000	143,000
Rocket rounds			
Large	2,125	4,000	8,000
Small	42,775	70,000	18,000
Recoilless rifle	28,240	17,300	N.A.
Mines	4,940	N.A.	N.A.

a. Operation About Face.

Standard VC/NVA infantry battalions maintain a basic ammunition load comprised of 48% small arms and 52% crew-served ammunition. The amount of individual small arms ammunition seized in Cambodia seems disproportionately high, 11.4 million rounds compared with 4.6 million rounds of machinegun, antiaircraft artillery, mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle rounds. This anomaly is underscored when these losses are placed in the context of expenditures. Losses of small arms ammunition combined with machinegun rounds are equivalent to 16 months' requirements, whereas the losses of large rocket, mortar, and recoilless rifle rounds are the equivalent of only 9½ months' requirements. It is interesting to note that losses of small arms ammunition in northern Laos were proportionately much lower than in Cambodia or South Vietnam. Significantly larger quantities of mortar and large rocket rounds were recovered in northern Laos and in South Vietnam than in Cambodia. In

view of the Communists' greater reliance on mortars and rockets in the initiation of indirect fire attacks in South Vietnam, it would seem that large numbers of rockets and mortars must remain in Cambodia. The ratio of mortar to large rocket expenditures in South Vietnam last year, for example, was 11:1. The capture ratio for these ammunition types in Cambodia has been 32:1. Thus it seems likely that the enemy may still have large quantities of rockets stored in Cambodia.

VC/NVA Capture of Arms and Ammunition  
from Cambodian Forces

12. Reporting on developments in the Cambodian countryside is extremely fragmentary. On the basis of the little information that is available, it is estimated that since 18 March Cambodian forces have lost at least the following supplies to the Communists:

<u>Arms and Equipment</u>	<u>Ammunition</u>
18 trucks, armored cars, and road equipment	10,940 individual cartridges
1,105 rifles	10 cases of cartridges
22 automatic rifles	8 cases of mortars
105 carbines	2 cases of grenades
245 submachineguns	200 boxes of mortar rounds
21 machineguns	60 boxes of assorted ammunition
2 heavy machineguns	2 tons of small arms ammunition
52 light machineguns	3 tons of machinegun ammunition
11 antiaircraft guns	
13 field guns	
10 rocket launchers	
17 grenade launchers	

13. These losses represent approximately 69 tons of arms and 14 tons of ammunition.\* The capture of a number of very heavy antiaircraft and field guns accounts for more than 60 tons of the total losses. In addition to the enumerated losses, a Cambodian ammunition depot at Kratie and a provincial storage area at Prey Vieng have been lost to the Communists, but to date no reports on the amount of supplies lost are available.

Shortages in Southern South Vietnam Since  
the Start of the Allied Operation in Cambodia

14. Since the beginning of the Cambodian operation, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] reports have revealed supply shortages in southern South Vietnam, some of which have been linked directly to the Cambodian operation, but many of which are typical of the shortages which are continually reported in that sector of the country. Prior to 30 April, III Corps was the area where the most severe shortages were observed -- that pattern has remained essentially the same since 30 April.

15. As a result of the Allied disruption of the Cambodian supply sanctuaries, some units have reported serious shortages of food and ammunition. One report indicated that Communist forces in southern III Corps expect significantly reduced logistical support from their supply system during the remainder of 1970, and instructions on the conservation of supplies reportedly have been issued by COSVN.

16. Supply shortages were common in southern South Vietnam prior to the Allied incursion. The trend since 30 April appears to be one of deep concern over the future availability of supplies resulting from the Cambodian incursions -- conservation appears to be the watchword, at least until the Communists can fully evaluate their supply losses. At the present time, reports of actual

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supply shortages do not appear to be substantially more critical than were observed prior to the Cambodian operation.

Recent Rates of Combat and Ammunition Expenditure

17. The rate of combat in III and IV Corps has not yet changed significantly as a result of the Cambodian operation. Comparing the average number of enemy actions from January through April with the two-month period of May and June, small-scale attacks (company size or smaller) dropped by roughly 55% in III Corps but picked up by nearly 30% in IV Corps. The number of other types of incidents, including harassment and terrorism, actually increased somewhat in May and June. An analysis of reported enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar expenditures in III and IV Corps during May and June compared with January through April shows expenditure rates averaging about one ton daily in both periods.



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Status of Roads and Waterways in the Panhandle

25. Thus far into the current rainy season, fragmentary aerial reconnaissance of the Panhandle roadnet indicates that (unlike last year) the North Vietnamese are attempting to keep their key infiltration routes to Cambodia and South Vietnam open. Repair efforts and continuing road maintenance have been observed on major roads throughout the Panhandle. In addition, road construction was noted still under

way in early July on new access roads leading out of the western corner of the DMZ, underscoring the importance placed by the enemy on this newly opened supply corridor.

26. By mid-May the Communists had under their control the Se Kong and Mekong Rivers extending from Ban Bac in Laos southward to Chhlong in Cambodia, some 75 miles north of Phnom Penh. Following the fall of Attopeu on 30 April, all civilian watercraft in the area reportedly were confiscated by the enemy, and an estimated 100 of these boats, loaded with supplies, reportedly were sent downriver to Communist encampments near the Cambodian border. Reports [redacted] in mid and late May revealed further enemy seizures of native craft north of Attopeu and also the building of a fleet of 45 motorized watercraft at Ban Bac. (Subsequent aerial photography over the Ban Bac area also revealed several larger than usual rivercraft moored near a well-stocked enemy transshipment point.) Aerial observers had reported in late April that enemy supply shipments on the upper Se Kong apparently had virtually ceased and that the channel guides in the river were in poor condition. By early May, however, pilots reported that the free-floating of supplies down the Se Kong had been resumed south of Ban Bac and that improvements were being made to the river. The Se Bang Hieng flowing west out of the DMZ also has been improved. In addition, FAC's have reported improvements being made along portions of the Se Xou River, which joins the Se Kong at Attopeu. The Se Xou forms a natural connector to the road system near the tri-border and could be used to ferry supplies from Attopeu to transshipment points within 15-20 miles of the South Vietnamese and Cambodian borders.

#### Supply Movements into Northeast Cambodia

27. There is little information on enemy supply movements south out of Laos into Cambodia.\*





However, the enemy does control the northeastern part of the country and can at any time exercise the option of moving supplies through the region. Since the Allied incursions into Cambodia, enemy forces have secured control of virtually all of north and north-east Cambodia. The major cross-border logistic routes -- the Mekong and the Tonle Kong Rivers and Routes 12, 13, and 97 (which connect southern Laos and Cambodia), and the Se San and Srepok Rivers and Route 19 (which lead from Cambodia to South Vietnam) -- are firmly under enemy control and can be used as inter-connecting supply routes. In this connection, in recent air strikes against Route 19 in Cambodia, which extends into the Pleiku area of South Vietnam, pilots have reported hitting several trucks and bulldozers, as well as supplies, near Bung Lung, about 30 miles from the South Vietnamese border.

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#### Sea Infiltration

29. Allied naval patrols detected four suspected Communist sea infiltration attempts between the start of the Cambodian operations and 6 July. Each of the craft, sighted in international waters, apparently sensed detection and aborted the mission. These attempts probably reflected the enemy's concern for resupplying his forces in IV Corps.

#### Summary and Conclusions

30. The two months of Allied operations into the VC/NVA base areas along the South Vietnam/Cambodia border resulted in the capture of nearly 9,200 tons of supplies. This tonnage represents a substantial loss and includes a portion of the strategic reserves

with which the Communists backstop their major war strategy in South Vietnam. The enemy's stockpiles prior to 30 April are estimated to have been at least 15,000 tons, and may well have been substantially greater.

31. Food (primarily rice) represents the largest single category of supply losses -- more than 75% of the total. The 7,100 tons captured represents nearly 70% of estimated enemy food stockpiles and is equal to about a 10 months' requirement of rice for enemy forces in southern South Vietnam. Food losses, however, are the least significant, for they can easily be replaced from the South Vietnam harvest or the January Cambodian crop. The second largest, and probably most significant, tonnage captured is ammunition. The 1,765 tons captured represents 16 months' requirements of small arms and heavy machinegun ammunition, and 9½ months' requirements of large rocket, mortar, and recoilless rifle rounds -- the tonnage exceeds the total lost to Allied ground action in all of South Vietnam in 1969. The reported losses will seriously affect the enemy's resupply capabilities in III and IV Corps. The smallest category of losses was weapons, which amounted to only 111 tons, of which only 35% are relatively new and of the type preferred by the Communists. This small tonnage -- more than four times that amount was captured in South Vietnam in 1969 -- does not represent a significant loss to the enemy and should not seriously degrade his combat capability.

32. The most lucrative captures of supplies took place in the Fishhook, the Parrot's Beak, and Base Area 351 operations -- these accounted for approximately 78% of food losses, 87% of ammunition losses, and 63% of weapons losses. Base Area 351 alone accounted for nearly half of the total losses of ammunition. Losses in the northern Base Areas included more than 1,100 tons of rice.

33. As expected, the greatest portion of weapons and ammunition captured were of Chinese and Soviet manufacture. Sixty percent of the weapons and 80% of the ammunition captured were of Chinese origin; 25% and 5%, respectively, were of Soviet origin.

34. To date, it does not appear that enemy units in South Vietnam have experienced critical supply shortages as a result of the Cambodian operations. They have, however, been instructed to economize in their use of supplies, indicating that the level of stocks has been seriously depleted.

35. The Cambodian incursions have had the probable effect of putting a ceiling on enemy combat capabilities in the southern half of South Vietnam for many months. The drive into Cambodia, in addition to capturing large quantities of supplies, has disrupted the north-south infiltration-logistic system along the Cambodian border. Although the Communists have demonstrated that they still have the capability to launch attacks in southern South Vietnam, they probably will feel restricted in continuing such actions until reliable supply lines are reestablished.

36. Following the Allied move into Cambodia, the Communists moved quickly to increase their logistics flexibility for supporting the war. In Cambodia, Communist units pushed westward from the South Vietnamese border bringing under enemy control numerous roads, trails, and the Mekong River in the northeastern part of the country. In Laos, the capture of Saravane and Attapeu, while not logistically vital, has facilitated the consolidation of North Vietnamese control in the southern part of the country. As a result, the Communists now have under their control additional resupply corridors from Laos to and through northeastern Cambodia. Hanoi has also responded in other ways to the Cambodian situation.

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Continued use of the Laotian Panhandle, although complicated by the monsoon rains and air interdiction effort, will insure a viable resupply corridor from North Vietnam to Cambodia during the summer. By not withdrawing logistic forces and maintaining the route structure in the Panhandle, the North Vietnamese also will be able to move large quantities of supplies earlier in the 1970-71 dry season than was the case during 1969-70 because the road system will not have to be rebuilt.

37. Finally, the Communists are likely to be able to move sufficient supplies from Laos to support combat and logistic operations in Cambodia over the next several months. This requirement can probably be met from existing stockpiles in the central and southern parts of the Laotian Panhandle. New ARVN sweeps in northeastern Cambodia would of course greatly compound the enemy's problems. Enemy units in the southern areas of South Vietnam, however, probably have been more seriously hurt. The stockpiles which supported them have been substantially depleted, the resupply corridors into southern South Vietnam have been disrupted, and the distance of the Communist forces from the Laotian corridor will seriously impede resupply efforts to the area.

## Distribution of Rice, Weapons, and Ammunition Captured

	Operation Rock Crusher IV	Operation Parrot's Beak (Toan Thang 42)	Operation Fishhook (Toan Thang 43)	Operation Tia Chop (Toan Thang 44)	Operation Giong To (Toan Thang 45)	Operation Hoc Ma (Toan Thang 46)	Binh Tay I	Binh Tay II	Binh Tay III	Cuu Long I	Cuu Long II	Cuu Long III	Total
Base Areas	387/708	387/708	352 <u>a/</u>	354	351	350	702	701	740	704/ 709	704	704 <u>b/</u>	
<i>Dates of Operation:</i>													
<i>Initiated</i>	28 Apr	28 Apr	30 Apr	5 May	5 May	5 May	5 May	12 May	<u>c/</u> 9 May	16 May	24 May		
<i>Terminated</i>	5 May	<u>d/</u>	30 Jun	14 May	30 Jun	30 Jun	25 May	27 May	<u>e/</u> 1 Jul	24 May	<u>d/</u>		
Rice (tons) <u>e/</u>													
ARVN	46	1,042	719	0	0	79	28	89	412	41	44	27	2,527
US	0	0	1,980	217	1,584	0	574	0	0	0	0	0	4,355
Total	46	1,042	2,699	217	1,584	79	602	89	412	41	44	27	6,882
Ammunition (tons)													
ARVN	63	360	95 <u>f/</u>	0	0	10	9 <u>f/</u>	27	40	23	65	40	732
US	0	0	221 <u>f/</u>	4	804	0	4 <u>f/</u>	0	0	0	0	0	1,033
Total	63	360	316	4	804	10	13	27	40	23	65	40	1,765
Weapons (tons) <u>g/</u>													
ARVN	7	16	8 <u>f/</u>	0	0	2	4 <u>f/</u>	4	5	11	4	10	71
US	0	0	21 <u>f/</u>	1	18	0	0 <u>f/</u>	0	0	0	0	0	40
Total	7	16	29	1	18	2	4	4	5	11	4	10	111
Grand total	116	1,418	3,044	222	2,406	91	619	120	457	76	113	77	8,758 <u>h/</u>

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## APPENDIX B

Weight Factors Used in Computing Ammunition  
and Weapons Losses in CambodiaAmmunition

Type	Weight (Pounds)	Type	Weight (Pounds)
SKS and AK-47	0.036	3.5-inch rocket	10.0
7.62 pistol	0.018	102-mm rocket	34.0
.30 caliber	0.057	107-mm rocket	42.0
.38 caliber	0.060	122-mm rocket	102.0
M-60	0.040	57-mm recoilless	
Unidentified small		rifle	5.7
arms	0.036	75-mm recoilless	
8-mm	0.018	rifle	20.35
7.92	0.046	85-mm gun	41.75
12 gauge	0.100	Antitank mine	10.0
7.5-mm	0.040	Antipersonnel mine	7.0
7.62	0.024	Hand grenade	1.0
M-16	0.040	Rifle grenade	0.5
.50 caliber	0.25	Bangalore torpedo	10.0
Machinegun	0.05	Claymore mine	20.0
12.7-mm	0.31	14.5-mm	0.44
20-mm antiaircraft	0.44	37-mm antiaircraft	3.25
60/61-mm mortar	3.3	4.2-inch mortar	31.0
81-mm mortar	7.2	82-mm mortar	8.0
120-mm mortar	28.0	RPG-2 rocket	3.65
RPG-7 rocket	5.1	Trash Can rocket	48.0

Weapons

AK-47 rifle	9.47	20-mm antiaircraft	1,630.0
SKS carbine	8.5	East German	
Russian rifle	8.6	machinegun	30.4
K-50 submachinegun	10.51	Czech machinegun	21.3
M-1 carbine	5.81	Machinegun	27.0
Mauser	9.0	7.62 machinegun	10.5
Mauser 69	9.0	12.7-mm machinegun	79.0
Springfield	8.75	14.5-mm machinegun	108.0
Mas 7.65 rifle	8.3	Bren	24.9

Weapons (continued)

Type	Weight (Pounds)	Type	Weight (Pounds)
Sten	8.4	3.5-inch rocket launcher	13.0
Chinese Communist rifle	8.9	RPG-2	6.23
Enfield rifle	9.6	RPG-7	14.5
M-1	9.15	40-mm mortar	30.0
M-16	6.5	60-mm mortar	44.5
K-54 pistol	2.44	82-mm mortar	123.0
M-79 grenade launcher	6.0	4.2-inch mortar	330.0
BAR light machinegun	20.5	120-mm mortar	606.0
9-mm submachinegun	9.0	122-mm rocket launcher	121.0
RPD machinegun	16.3	107-mm rocket launcher	100.0
PPSh machinegun	11.5	57-mm recoilless rifle	78.3
7.92 machinegun	9.0	75-mm recoilless rifle	143.5
Thompson submachinegun	9.13	Flamethrower	30.0
Chinese Communist light machinegun	28.0	.45 caliber pistol	2.5
.303 light machinegun	24.9	P-38 pistol	2.1
.30 caliber light machinegun	33.0	Sniper pistol	9.9
.50 caliber light machinegun	128.0	Shotgun	9.0
M-60	23.0	Light machinegun	25.0
Chinese heavy machinegun	59.3	French rifle	8.3
		Unidentified, individual	9.5
		Unidentified, crew-served	51.0
		Enfield machinegun	27.0



25X1

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<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE <i>28 Jul 70</i>
TO: <i>I/L</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:  <i>Advanced copy presented</i> <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 150px; margin: 5px 0;"></div> <i>Branch file</i>		
FROM: <b>St/P/ER—Control</b>		
ROOM NO. <b>4F41</b>	BUILDING <b>Hdqs.</b>	
FORM NO. <b>241</b> 1 FEB 55		REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

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